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The experimenTs
senTence comprehension, simulaTion and effecTors
Several recent studies have provided evidence of the involvement 
of the premotor cortex in reading and hearing action words and 
action sentences (Aziz-Zadeh and Damasio, 2008). Tettamanti et al. 
(2005) conducted an fMRI study illustrating that a complex fronto-
parietal circuit is activated when presenting sentences describing 
actions performed with the mouth, the hand or the foot. Within this 
circuit a critical role seems to be assumed by Broca’s area, but in a 
way that extends the traditional linguistic role of this area. In fact, 
Broca’s area is found to be crucially involved in language processing, 
as well as in action observation. Pulvermüller et al. (2001) found 
topographical differences in the brain activity patterns generated 
by verbs referring to different effectors (mouth, legs, arms: e.g. lick, 
kick, pick); these differences emerged quite early, starting 250 ms 
after word onset. This very fast activation, its automaticity and its 
somatotopic organization render it unlikely that information is first 
transduced in an abstract format and later influences the motor 
system, as claimed by critiques of the embodied view. In particular, 
the early activation of the motor system strongly suggests that this 
activation is an integrant part of the comprehension process rather 
than only a by-product of it, or an effect of late motor imagery. 
Further studies utilising a variety of techniques (fMRI, MEG, etc.) 
support the hypothesis that action verb processing quickly produces 
a somatotopic activation of the motor and premotor cortices (e.g. 
Hauk et al., 2004; Pulvermüller et al., 2005). In line with these results, 
Buccino et al. (2005) designed a TMS study that showed an ampli-
tude decrease of MEPs recorded from hand muscles when listen-
ing to hand-action related sentences, and from foot muscles when 
listening to foot related sentences. This confirms a   somatotopic 
inTroducTion
According to theories of embodied and grounded cognition (from 
here on EC theories), language is grounded in the sensorimotor sys-
tem. In this sense, the same sensorimotor and emotional systems 
are supposed to be involved during perception, action and language 
comprehension. More specifically, language comprehension would 
involve an embodied simulation, whose neural underpinnings are to 
be found in wide neural circuits, crucially involving canonical and 
mirror neurons (Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Gallese, 2008). In cognitive 
neuroscience the notion of simulation has been defined differently 
(for a more detailed analysis of this, see Borghi and Cimatti, 2010; 
for a review, see Decety and Grezes, 2006). Here we define simula-
tion, with Jeannerod (2007), as the offline recruitment (for instance, 
during language processing) of the same neural networks involved 
in perception and action. In addition, we qualify it, as did Gallese 
(2009), as an embodied and automatic mechanism, which allows us 
to understand others’ behaviors. The automaticity of this process 
does not imply an intentional strategy to understand intentions and 
mental states. In keeping with these views, the underlying assumption 
of our work is that the activation of motor and sensorimotor cortices 
is not just a side-effect but effectively contributes to language compre-
hension. In this paper we review behavioral and kinematics studies 
conducted in our lab which help to characterize the relationship exist-
ing between language and the motor system (see also Scorolli et al., 
2009). We will focus on studies utilising simple sentences composed 
for example by a verb and a noun. In the final part of the paper we 
discuss why we believe these studies have implications for embodied 
robotics. Further, we will claim that embodied robotics can contrib-
ute critically to psychology and neuroscience and can promote more 
detailed predictions on some critical issues.
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were required to produce the first five nouns they associated with 
each verb; no difference in production means was present between 
“mouth sentences” and “hand sentences”, p = 0.65, and between 
“foot sentences” and “hand sentences”, p = 1. The timer started 
after the noun presentation, and participants were required to 
respond whether the verb–noun combination made sense or not. 
Yes responses were recorded either with the microphone or with 
a pedal. We found a facilitation effect in responses to “mouth sen-
tences” and “foot sentences” compared with “hand sentences” when 
the effectors – mouth and foot – involved in the motor response 
and in the sentence were congruent (Figure 1). More specifically, 
participants responding with the microphone were faster with 
mouth than with hand sentences, p < 0.01 (Figure 1A), whereas 
the difference between foot and hand reached significance but 
was far less marked, p < 0.05 (Figure 1B). Participants using the 
pedal responded faster to foot than to hand sentences, p < 0.0005 
(Figure 1B), whereas the difference between hand and mouth sen-
tences was not significant, p < 0.8 (Figure 1A). These results suggest, 
in line with the literature, that the simulation activated during 
sentence comprehension is sensitive to the kind of effector implied 
by the sentence. In previous behavioral studies only foot and hand 
sentences were compared; our study extends previous results as we 
found a difference between mouth and hand sentences as well.
In a further study (Borghi and Scorolli, 2009) we found that the 
simulation is sensitive not only to the kind of effector (mouth vs. 
hand, foot vs. hand), but also to the specific effector (right vs. left 
hand) used to respond. We performed five experiments with the 
same sentence presentation modality and task used in Scorolli and 
Borghi (2007); 97 right-handed participants were asked to decide 
whether verb–noun combinations made sense or not. We analyzed 
both combinations which made sense (e.g. “to kick the ball”) and 
combinations which did not make sense (e.g. “to melt the chair”). 
Here we will focus on Experiments 1, 2, and 3, as Experiment 4 was 
recruitment of motor areas. As reported in the meta-analysis per-
formed by Jirak, Menz, Borghi and Binkofski (under review), the 
involvement of motor areas in language processing is consistent 
over tasks and subjects (for a more critical view, see Willems and 
Hagoort, 2007). In particular, word and sentence processing involves 
a variety of brain regions, including parietal, temporal, and fron-
tal, but also cerebellar activity, and, even if the right hemisphere is 
also activated, there is a clear predominance of activations in the 
(language and motor areas of the) left hemisphere. In addition, the 
results of the meta-analysis highlight areas presumably containing 
mirror neurons in humans, more specifically Broca’s region, which 
may be described as the human homolog of the monkey premotor 
cortex (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004).
We will now describe studies performed in our lab, as they 
extend the previous behavioral evidence. Here we have illustrated 
that during language comprehension we are sensitive to the distinc-
tion between hand and mouth sentences, and between foot and 
mouth sentences as well.
In the first study we performed two experiments in which 40 
participants read simple sentences from a computer screen that 
were composed of a verb in the infinitive form followed by an object 
noun (Scorolli and Borghi, 2007). The sentences referred to either 
hand, mouth or foot actions. The hand sentences represented the 
baseline: thus, the same noun was presented after either a foot or 
hand verb (e.g. “to kick the ball”, vs. “to throw the ball”) or either 
after a mouth or hand verb (e.g. “to suck the sweet”, vs. “to unwrap 
the sweet”). Overall, we had 24 object nouns, each preceded by two 
different verbs, for a total of 48 critical pairs. Presenting the same 
noun after the verb allowed us to be sure that no frequency effect 
took place. We did not control for the verb frequency, because the 
verb was presented before we started recording. However, in a pre-
test we controlled for the association rate between the verb and the 
noun, as this might influence performance. Eighteen participants 
Figure 1 | Participants using the microphone responded with greater speed to “mouth sentences” than to “hand sentences” (A), p < 0.01. Symmetrically, 
participants who used the pedal as responding device were significantly faster for “foot sentences” than for “hand sentences” (B), p < 0. 0005.Frontiers in Neurorobotics  www.frontiersin.org  June 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 3  |  3
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actions entail. However, further studies are needed, to deepen 
the role played by action goals (for a recent study focusing on the 
importance of goals in action organization in monkeys, see Umiltà 
et al., 2008. The issue of goals will be discussed later). The results 
described so far report a facilitation effect in case of congruency 
between the effector implied by the verb/sentence and the effector 
used to respond. Even if the evidence we found supports the idea 
that the different effectors (mouth and foot) are activated during 
language processing, our behavioral results contrast with the results 
by Buccino et al. (2005), who found an interference effect between 
the effector involved in the sentence (hand, foot) and the effector 
involved in the motor response (hand, foot).
Certainly, in both cases there is clear evidence of a modulation 
of the motor system during sentence comprehension, thus this 
evidence is certainly in favor of an embodied cognition perspec-
tive. However, knowing more precisely the specific timing of this 
modulation (Boulenger et al., 2006), as well as the details of this 
modulation, would be crucial for solving a lot of issues. The first 
issue is that, even if the somatotopic activation of the motor sys-
tem suggests that the motor system is involved during language 
comprehension, we do not yet fully understand if the activation 
of the motor system is necessary for comprehension or whether it 
is just a by-product of it (Mahon and Caramazza, 2008). A better 
understanding of the relationships between the comprehension 
process and motor system activation, both in terms of time-course 
and processes, would be crucial as it would allow researchers to 
formulate clearer predictions.
Many interpretations of the discrepancies between the results 
have been proposed. One possibility is that these discrepancies 
are due to timing between linguistic stimulus, motor instruc-
tions and motor response. It is possible that, when the motor 
system is activated both for preparing an action with a given 
effector and for processing action words referring to the same 
effector, an interference effect takes place due to the contempo-
rary recruitment of the same resources. Later, a facilitation effect 
might occur (see Chersi et al., 2010). This explanation is in line 
with evidence on language and motor resonance that has shown 
that the compatibility effect between action and sentence (ACE, 
that is the facilitation effect) was present only when the motor 
a control one. In Experiments 1a,b we used only manual sentences, 
in Experiment 2 hand and mouth sentences, in Experiment 3 hand 
and foot sentences. Responses to hand sentences (Experiment 1) 
were faster than responses to non-sense sentences with the right 
hand, but not with the left hand (Figure 2A), as it appeared in the 
subject analyses and on materials (we will report the p-values for 
both analyses in sequence): p < 0.05; p < 0.0000001. Importantly, 
such an advantage of the right over the left hand was not present 
when sensible sentences were not action ones: p = 0.99; p = 0.75. 
The same advantage of the right over the left hand with sensible 
sentences was present in Experiment 2 (Figure 2B), in which both 
hand and mouth sentences were presented, even if it reached sig-
nificance only in the analysis on items, p < 0.0000001. This suggests 
that participants simulated performing the action with the domi-
nant hand. Crucially the advantage of the right hand for sensible 
sentences was not present with foot sentences, with which, probably 
due to an inhibitory mechanism, the effect was exactly the oppo-
site, as left hand responses were faster than right hand ones with 
sensible sentences, p = 0.055; p < 0.0000001 (Figure 2C). These 
results complement the previous findings as they suggest that the 
motor simulation formed is not only sensitive to different effectors 
(mouth, hand, foot), but also to the different action capability of 
the two hands, the left and the right one. The similarity between the 
responses with hand and mouth sentences can be due to the fact that 
different effectors can be involved in single actions, and the simi-
larity of the performance obtained by hand and mouth sentences 
could be due to the fact that hands and mouth are represented corti-
cally in contiguous areas. However, it may also suggest that not only 
proximal aspects, such as the kind of effector, modulate the motor 
responses, but also distal aspects, such as the action goal. Consider 
an action such as sucking a sweet: it probably also activates manual 
actions such as the action of grasping the sweet and bringing it to 
the mouth. In sum: it is possible that the similar modulation of the 
motor response is due to the common goal evoked by hand and 
mouth sentences (see also Gentilucci et al., 2008).
Overall, the results of these two studies indicate that language 
processing activates an action simulation that is sensitive to the 
effector involved. In addition, they suggest that understanding 
action  sentences  implies  comprehension  of  the  goals  that  the 
Figure 2 | When pairs referred to manual and mouth actions (A, B), participants responded faster with the dominant than with the left hand in case of 
sensible sentences. When pairs referred to manual and foot actions (C) the results were opposite.Frontiers in Neurorobotics  www.frontiersin.org  June 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 3  |  4
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instruction was presented simultaneously to the beginning of 
the sentence rather than after sentence presentation (Borreggine 
and Kaschak, 2006; Zwaan and Taylor, 2006). In the study by 
Buccino et al. (2005) participants on presentation of a “go” sig-
nal had to respond to the second syllable of a verb preceding a 
noun; time was measured from this point. Instead in our experi-
ments we didn’t use a “go” signal: we first presented a verb, then 
a noun, and started measuring after the appearance of the noun. 
Concerning the temporal relationship between language and the 
motor task, the linguistic stimulus appearance seems to affect 
not only the movement’s speed (reactions times) but also the 
overt motor behavior, as revealed by detailed analyses of move-
ment kinematics (Boulenger et al. 2006; Dalla Volta et al., 2009). 
Boulenger et al. (2006) found that when contemporaneously 
processing language and executing motor tasks, action verbs 
hinder reaching movements. An interference effect occurred as 
early as 160–180 ms after word onset when participants started 
the response movement before word presentation (Experiment 
1). On the contrary a priming effect became evident at about 
550–580 ms after word onset when the word acted as go-signal 
for the response movement. Along this line, Dalla Volta et al. 
(2009) found that there is an early interference effect on the 
effective movement (kinematics measures) and a late facilitation, 
detectable through RTs analyses.
Another possibility is that the interference effect is not only 
aroused by timing but by the interaction between two factors: 
the temporal overlap and the so called “integrability”, that is the 
degree to which the perceptual input could be integrated into the 
simulation activated by language. For example, in studies where 
both sentences and perceptual stimuli were presented, when the 
perceptual stimuli were abstract and difficult to integrate, an inter-
ference effect occurred; otherwise a facilitation effect took place. 
The difficulty seems to rest on the shared contents between the 
percept and the simulation of the sentence, and on the tempo-
ral overlap (Kaschak et al., 2005; Borreggine and Kaschak, 2006). 
However, due to the difficulty of integration between perceptual 
and linguistic stimuli this explanation may be contradicted when 
accounting for the interference and facilitation effects occurring 
when using linguistic stimuli.
A  further  possibility  is  that  these  discrepancies  are  due  to 
the varying paradigms and stimuli used. For example, in some 
cases tasks requiring superficial processing (e.g. lexical decision 
tasks) are employed, whereas in other cases tasks requiring deeper 
semantic processing are used (this position is supported by Sato 
et al., 2008). More specifically, even in the case of deep semantic 
processing, results may differ depending on the task at hand. For 
instance, whether the task requires evaluating the whole sentence 
(e.g. Scorolli and Borghi, 2007; Borghi and Scorolli, 2009, asked 
participants to evaluate the sensibility of the verb–noun combina-
tion) or the verb (e.g. Buccino et al. required participants to evaluate 
whether the action verb was abstract or concrete).
A final possibility which should be explored is that the effect 
emerges differently depending on the type of pronoun used to 
indicate the agent of the action. In this sense pronouns induce a spe-
cific perspective on action, which modulates the motor system. For 
example, we found that the simulation triggered by the pronouns 
“I” and “you” have a different effect on kinematics parameters of 
action. In addition, it is possible that the third person pronoun 
(see Buccino et al., 2005) may partially activate a simulation, thus 
relying on more abstract processes.
Overall,  further  research  is  necessary  to  disentangle  which 
mechanisms are underlying interference and facilitation effects. 
However, we believe that further experimental data are not suffi-
cient. Namely, modeling could help to understand how the process 
might occur, and might be helpful to propose more detailed and 
clearer predictions for new experiments. Modeling could help us 
to understand whether interference and facilitation are two sides of 
the same coin, or whether they rely on different mechanisms (for 
an attempt to model interference and facilitation effects, Chersi 
et al., 2010).
senTence comprehension, simulaTion, goals and 
social aspecTs
In the previous studies we have seen that during language process-
ing we form a simulation sensitive not only to the specific effector, 
but also to the goal conveyed by the sentence.
Consider for example giving somebody an object: how and to 
what extent is the action of “giving” represented differently from 
the action of, say, holding the object? These two actions imply two 
different goals, and these different goals imply a different chain of 
motor acts. Namely, in order to hold an object we need to reach 
and then grasp it, whereas in order to give an object to someone 
else we need to reach and grasp it, as well as to give it to the other 
agent involved in the interaction. Thus, in order to pursue the goal 
it conveys, this “interactive” action implies a longer sequence of 
chained motor acts.
Goal-relatedness of action has recently received much atten-
tion, in particular since Fogassi et al. (2005) demonstrated study-
ing the monkey parietal cortex that motor acts, such as “grasping”, 
are coded according to the specific action (e.g. “grasping for eat-
ing” vs. “grasping for placing”) in which these acts are embedded. 
Moreover, this coding is present both when the action is performed 
and when it is observed, that is a mirror mechanism is involved. The 
idea that actions have a chained organization has been extended to 
humans, in particular for what concerns action observation and 
understanding. Iacoboni et al. (2005) used fMRI to demonstrate 
the presence of a chained organization that differs depending on 
the intention of the agent. Other studies have been conducted, 
showing that impairment of chain organization might be linked to 
autism spectrum disorder (Cattaneo et al., 2007; Boria et al., 2009; 
Fabbri-Destro et al., 2009). However, no behavioral task has yet 
been conducted, demonstrating the importance of chained organi-
zation in the normal adult population. Additionally, to our knowl-
edge the only study investigating the extent to which this chained 
organization is encoded in language was a kinematics study recently 
performed in our lab, by Gianelli and Borghi (Gianelli and Borghi: 
I grasp, You give: when language translates actions, submitted), in 
which we identified different components of verbs (for a similar 
approach, see Kemmerer, et al., 2008) and distinguished between 
action verbs (e.g. “to grasp”) and interaction verbs (e.g. “to give”). 
These two kinds of verbs, which differ both for their chained organi-
zation and for their goal (acting with an object vs. interacting with 
another agent), had a different impact on kinematics parameters. 
That is, participants’ response (e.g. reaching–grasping an object) Frontiers in Neurorobotics  www.frontiersin.org  June 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 3  |  5
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ugly) and by an action part (bring it towards you/give it to another 
person). Their task consisted of deciding whether the sentence made 
sense or not by moving the mouse towards or away from their body. 
In three experiments we manipulated the recipient of the action, 
which could be “another person”, “a table”, or “a friend”.
Results showed that the direction (away or towards the body) of 
the movement performed to respond was influenced by the direc-
tion of the motion implied by the sentence and the stimuli valence. 
Crucially, stimulus valence had a different impact depending on the 
relational context the sentence evoked (action involving another 
agent or just oneself). We found that, whereas participants tended to 
move the mouse towards their body when they had to judge actions 
referring to positive objects, with negative objects the movement 
varied depending on the action recipient. Namely, when dealing 
with negative objects participants tended to treat friends as them-
selves, being equally slow to attract negative objects and to offer 
them to friends. This was not the case for the recipient “table” and 
for indistinct “another person”. In Table 1 we compare the effect on 
RTs of different recipients, “another person”, “a table” or “a friend” 
in the two conditions of giving positive or negative objects.
A further result is worth noting. The paradigm we used in 
this study allowed us to disentangle information provided by the 
verb and kinematics information related to the real movement 
participants were required to produce to respond. Namely, given 
the experimental design we used, in half of the cases there was a 
mismatch between the information conveyed by the verb (bring 
vs. give) and the movement to perform (towards or away from 
participant’s body). Our results showed that the role played by the 
verb, which defines the action goal, was more important than the 
role played by the kinematics of the movement. This is in line with 
the Theory of Event Coding (Hommel et al., 2001), according to 
which actions are represented in terms of distal aspects, an overall 
goal, rather than in terms of the proximal ones, and with neuro-
physiological studies showing that actions are represented in the 
brain primarily in terms of goals (e.g. Umiltà et al., 2008).
discussion
Overall, our results suggest that the simulation evoked during sen-
tence comprehension is fine-grained, as it is sensitive both to proxi-
mal and to distal information (effectors and goals). Additionally, 
the results show that actions are represented in terms of goals and 
of the motor acts necessary to reach them. Finally, they indicate 
that these goals are modulated by the characteristics of both objects 
and agents implied by sentences: this is observed due to the dif-
ference between actions involving only the self in comparison to 
those involving others.
was modulated according to the typical kinematics involved by the 
actions described by action and interaction verbs. Namely, since 
interaction verbs describe the interaction with another person, the 
kinematics in response to interaction verbs is modulated according 
to an increased requirement for accuracy and precision. That is, 
the same act of reaching and grasping an object needs to be more 
accurate when performed in order to give the object to another 
person, hence performing an additional motor act. Specifically, 
the deceleration phase is longer. The same effect is found during 
processing of verbs referring to the same action. This suggests that 
the chained organization of actions according to more or less inter-
actional goals is translated by language. This chained organization 
can be reactivated when the motor system is activated, thus similarly 
contributing to language processing.
The results of this study suggest that sentences referring to 
actions involving other people (e.g. giving something) are repre-
sented differently in comparison to sentences referring to actions 
involving a relationship between an agent and an object (e.g. hold-
ing something). However, this study did not allow us to disentangle 
whether the difference was due to the different chain of motor 
events involved in the two actions, or whether it was due to a dif-
ference in the social framework the two sentences referred to. To 
elaborate, do “grasp” and “give” differ at a motor level because of 
the chain they imply, and the different motor acts used, or do they 
differ because their “goal”, as defined not only by a sequence of 
motor acts but also by the social dimension in which the action is 
performed? Namely, in the case of “give” the presence of another 
person is implied, while in the case of grasp it is not. Hence, their 
goal and their value differ. Even if the action chain organization 
characterizes both the canonical and the mirror neuron system, it 
is possible that, depending on the social framework the sentence 
describes, there is a different involvement of these two systems. Now 
consider words referring to objects which differ in valence, to take 
an example, words such as “nice” or “ugly”. Literature on approach/
avoidance movements has used a variety of behavioral studies to 
demonstrate that when we read positive words we are faster in 
producing a movement with our body; the opposite is true when 
we read negative words (e.g. Chen and Bargh, 1999; Niedenthal 
et al., 2005; van Dantzig et al., 2008; Freina et al., 2009).
We conducted three experiments to explore whether the triadic 
relation between objects, ourselves and other natural and artifi-
cial agents modulates the motor system activation during sentence 
comprehension. We used sentences that referred to nice/ugly objects 
and to different kinds of recipients (Lugli, Baroni, Gianelli, Borghi 
and Nicoletti (under review)). Participants were presented with 
sentences formed by a descriptive part (e.g. the object is attractive/
Table 1 | Mean response times (rTs, in milliseconds) in the “another person” – “table” – “friend” target/negative object condition and “another 
person” – “table” – “friend” target/positive object condition.
experiment  “Another person” – “table” –   “Another person” – “table” – “  difference 
  “friend” target/negative  “friend” target/positive 
  Objects  objects
Exp. 1 “Another”  1645  1634  11
Exp. 2 – “Table”  1834  1834  0
Exp. 3 – “Friend”  1662  1609  53Frontiers in Neurorobotics  www.frontiersin.org  June 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 3  |  6
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system, embodied robotics models cannot contribute to provide an 
adequate account of human linguistic comprehension capabilities. 
We prefer to adopt a weaker embodied view. We propose that robotic 
models can strongly represent embodied theories of cognition. To 
elaborate, robotics could be a powerful instrument to explore the 
extent to which the similarity between the sensorimotor system of 
different organisms, artificial and natural, constrains the emergence 
of cognition, and the emergence of language comprehension abili-
ties. In this respect, it might be critical to use robotic models of the 
sensorimotor system that differ at different degrees from the human 
one. This could contribute to determine the importance of embodi-
ment theories: namely, it would allow researchers to better under-
stand which aspects of humans’ neural and sensorimotor system are 
critical and determine modifications in humans’ behavior.
The third type of constraints, which are referred to as “behavio-
ral constraints”, are directly linked with the capability of the model 
to reproduce and replicate the behaviors produced during the 
experiments. Having a model which respects the three constraints 
we outlined would facilitate formulating a synthetic and general 
theory of the relationships between language and the motor system. 
Namely, it could contribute to a synthesis effort thus identifying 
the crucial underpinnings of our behavior.
We believe a model that accounts for the constraints we have 
illustrated should be able to individuate general principles that 
combine important characteristics of the relationship between lan-
guage and the motor system. In the behavioral studies we reported, 
the critical points which are worth modeling are the following:
The fact that
–  during language comprehension the underlying motor and 
premotor cortices are activated;
–  the motor system has a chained organization, and that this 
organization is encoded in language;
–  actions, as well as words and sentences referring to actions, are 
encoded firstly in terms of distal aspects (overall goal), then of 
proximal ones (e.g. effectors);
–  the different social framework in which the actions are inscri-
bed can change the way in which the action is represented.
On this basis, a model should contribute in detail and explain:
–  the time-course as well as the mechanisms underlying the inter-
ference and the facilitation effects occurring between effectors 
implied by action verbs/action sentences and the effectors used 
to provide a response;
–  the mechanisms according to which the different number of 
motor acts involved in an action chain constrain the compre-
hension of different action verbs and action sentences;
–  the mechanisms according to which, even if the length of a 
motor chain does not differ, action goals have influences on 
the comprehension of action verbs/action sentences and how 
this influences movement;
–  the mechanisms according to which, even if the length of a 
motor chain does not differ the language referring to the pre-
sence of objects and/or of other organisms implies the activa-
tion of different neural mechanisms (e.g. canonical vs. mirror 
neurons) which differently affect behavior.
We believe that realizing a model of these experiments would be 
important for understanding the relationships between language and 
motor system. Namely, modeling could contribute to create a theory of 
their relationship, which is detailed and advances clear predictions. In 
this direction, models can help to integrate a variety of different empiri-
cal results, obtained with different paradigms and different techniques, 
within a common framework. However, it is important that models 
do not only replicate experimental studies, but rather provide general 
principles and generate predictions to be tested empirically.
One could ask which kinds of models can help to interpret 
experimental results as the described ones, and help to formulate 
novel predictions.
Simple feed-forward models are probably not sufficient, as they 
may not provide an adequate formalization for embodied theories. 
Namely, feed-forward models are endowed with an input and an 
output lawyer which strongly resembles the traditional sandwich 
of dis-embodied theories of cognition. A recurrent network would 
probably be more suitable to detect the reciprocal influence of 
perception and action.
On a general level, modeling should respect a variety of con-
straints (see Caligiore et al., 2009; Caligiore, Borghi, Parisi and 
Baldassarre (accepted)).
The first kind of constraints are the neurobiological ones. Namely, 
the model’s neural system should be endowed with at least some 
crucial characteristics of the human neural system. In particular, the 
neural underpinnings of motor simulations formed during language 
comprehension are represented by wide neural circuits that – cru-
cially – involve canonical and mirror neurons (Gallese et al., 1996; 
Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Therefore, the model should be 
endowed with a simulated neural system which reproduces both 
canonical and mirror neurons. More specifically, the motor sys-
tem of the model should be organized in such a way that chains of 
actions are implemented so that each sequence includes different 
motor acts, and is organized around goals. One exemplar model, 
that clearly describes this phenomenon, was presented by Chersi 
et al. (2005, 2006), who modeled the study by Fogassi et al. (2005) 
using a chain model. Additionally, the model has been extended to 
explain how intention understanding and mental simulation take 
place. We believe that this model could be extended to study whether 
a chained organization explains the differences between verbs and 
sentences, for example between action and interaction verbs. Other 
hierarchical action schemas have been suggested in the literature, 
for example by Botvinick et al. (2009), adopted a reinforcement 
learning hierarchical model. Botvinick (2008) reviews how hier-
archical models of action are being more frequently referred to. 
This is probably due to the fact that the way in which how general 
and abstract action representation emerges from action compo-
nents, and the role of prefrontal cortex in this process, is becoming 
an important issue for neuroscientific research. The second kind 
of constraints are “embodiment constraints”. Namely, it would be 
important to replicate the experiments using embodied models, 
i.e. models endowed not only with a brain which is similar to that 
of humans, but also with a body which is similar to ours. In sum: 
robots should be endowed with a sensorimotor system similar, at 
least in some respects, to a humans’ sensorimotor system. Consider 
that assuming a strong embodied view would lead to the claim 
that, given the differences between robots and humans sensorimotor Frontiers in Neurorobotics  www.frontiersin.org  June 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 3  |  7
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conclusion
In conclusion: we believe that embodied robotics can greatly 
contribute to a better understanding of the mechanisms under-
lying the relationship between language and the motor system. 
We argue that roboticists and modelers should work along-
side empirical scientists in order to improve abilities to con-
strue models which do not only account for empirical results, 
but also formulate predictions that constrain and guide new 
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